The Use of Demonstrative Evidence by Spangenberg, Craig
THE USE OF DEMONSTRATIVE EVIDENCE
CRAIG SPANGENBERG*
There is nothing new in the principles of demonstrative evidence.
The successful fisherman who mounts his trophy for display uses
effective demonstrative evidence. The old Anglo-Saxon trial by ordeal
was based on the faith that a supernatural agency would intervene
and give demonstration of the innocence of the accused by making
the water reject his person, in the ordeal by water, or by making his
burned hands heal without infection, in the ordeal by fire. Long
before that, Doubting Thomas had earned his name and place in
history by demanding to see and feel the wounds of his Master, being
unable to believe the miracle without demonstrative evidence of its
truth.
Demonstrative evidence has long been used in Ohio trials. It
was decided in 1897 that a photographic negative produced by Roent-
gen rays, showing the size and shape of a broken bone, was admissible
when properly identified.1 A Pennsylvania court as early as 1856 had
said succinctly, "A look is better than a description" 2 paraphrasing
the maxim of Confucius that a picture is worth ten thousand words.
Although the demonstrative techniques are not new, certainly
recent years have seen much wider interest in its use, and much
broader application of demonstrative tools. The legal principles have
been well defined, and may be summarized quite briefly. Demon-
strative evidence is admissible if it is relevant, and if its explanatory
value outweighs the possible passion or prejudice it might arouse.
The trial judge has a broad discretion to compare the probative value
of the proffered evidence against the danger of passion, distraction, or
prejudicial overemphasis, and only in the most flagrant and patent
abuse of this discretion will the trial court's ruling be disturbed.
The fact that the exhibit may be gruesome or revolting is not
ground for exclusion if the exhibit has probative value. In an early
Minnesota case' the court censured counsel for even offering a pre-
served, amputated hand. The dismembered part was offered only to
show pain and suffering, and clearly the gruesomeness of the exhibit
outweighed any probative value on that issue. A different ruling was
made in another amputated hand case,4 where there was a dispute
whether the plaintiff had caught his hand at the edge of the roller
Member of the firm of Harrison, Spangenberg & Hull, Cleveland, Ohio.
1 Tish v. Welker, 5 Ohio Dec. 725, 7 Ohio N.P. 472 (1897).
Fowler v. Sergeant, 1 Grant 355 (1856).
3 Evans v. Chicago, M. & St. P.R.R., 133 Minn. 293, 158 N.W. 335 (1916).
4 Anderson v. Seropian, 147 Cal. 201, 81 Pac. 521 (1905).
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on a press, or had caught it between the rollers and the stencil of the
press while he was operating it. His pickled hand, in a jar, was re-
ceived in evidence in this case because the preserved skin showed a
streak of ink across the hand, which tended to prove it had in fact
gone under the stencil.
In Johkn Holland Gold Pen Co. v. Juengling,5 where the plaintiff's
hair and a portion of her scalp had been torn from her head by a re-
volving shaft, the court held no error occurred in receiving in evidence
the scalp and hair preserved in a jar of alcohol. The defendant claimed
the sole purpose of the exhibit was to excite sympathy, but the court
pointed out that the exhibit was convincing evidence of the quantity
and quality of the hair lost and the size and thickness of the avulsed
scalp. A curious facet of this case is that the trial court had, at the
defendant's insistence, required plaintiff to wear her hat upon her head
as she sat in the courtroom during the trial, except for the occasion
when her partially denuded head was exhibited to the jury for close
inspection. The appellate court held that this ruling was a proper
exercise of the discretion of the trial court, which has broad power
to prevent the abuse of any demonstration.
An astute trial lawyer would have kept the plaintiff's head
covered in any event. A repulsive injury, long gazed upon, loses its
revolting quality and tends to become accepted. The skillful trial man
will make his exhibit of the injury very brief, to preserve its impact.
The objection that a hideous injury will excite the jury's emotion
is not well taken. The court in Slattery v. Marra Bros., Inc.,6 pointed
out that although a repulsive injury may tend to excite emotion, the
very hideousness of the deformity is a substantial part of the suffering
and humiliation of the victim which can not rationally be excluded in
the assessment of damages.
In a recent Illinois case' plaintiff had suffered injuries in the
pelvic area. The shapes and relationships of the bones making up
the pelvic girdle are difficult to describe and hard to visualize even
with clear description. Plaintiff's attorney furnished the doctor with
a plastic model of a normal skeleton, which the doctor used in his
testimony to illustrate normal configuration and alignment, and com-
pared with X-rays of the plaintiff to demonstrate the displacement in
the plaintiff's healed fractures. The doctor also explained, with the
model, how the muscles are arranged and attached and how the weight
of the upper torso is transmitted, through the pelvis, to the legs. The
mechanical disadvantage suffered by plaintiff because of his deformity
2 Ohio App. 20 (1913).
186 F.2d 134 (1951).
7 Smith v. Ohio Oil Co., 10 Ill. App. 2d 67, 134 N.E.2d 526 (1956).
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became understandable and apparent. Defendant appealed from an
adverse verdict on the ground that the skeleton was gruesome, tended
only to arouse emotion, and was unnecessary to an understanding of
'the issues as to injury. The appellate court said "[We] weigh the
explanatory value of an object against its possible emotional effect,
with no flat rule that a gruesome object cannot be used." It was held
that the skeletal model was useful in the enlightenment of the jury,
was not overly dramatic, and had been properly used.
This case tontains the key to successful use of medical models.
The model should be introduced by the doctor, and used by the doctor
in explaining the medical problem to the jury. The trial lawyer has
the task of educating the jury in an area where their ignorance is
usually profound-the basic anatomy of the human body. The lawyer
ought to use the same educational tools that the medical school
faculties use in the training of medical students. Medical supply
houses, such as Clay-Adams Co. of New York, Denoyer-Geppert Co.
of Chicago, and Medical Plastic Laboratory of Gatesville, Texas,
stock an astonishing array of models of the human anatomy and its
component parts. There are models not only of skeletal parts, but of
all the organs, and nervous and vascular systems. Many of these
models may be disarticulated, or have cut-aways to expose hidden
internal structures. In addition to three-dimensional models, the
medical supply houses can furnish anatomical charts and colored
slides for projection.
Another source of demonstrative medical material is the medical
textbook. Illustrations, cross-sectional views and diagrams, and color
plates may be reproduced photographically or may be projected on a
screen by use of an opaque projector. The jury will surely better
understand the quality and effect of an injury if the design and
function of the normal anatomy is first understood.
The injury itself is subject to demonstration in most cases. The
use of X-ray negatives to show fracture lines and displacement is
commonplace. Less often seen, but worthy of greater use, is the X-ray
positive in which the negative is used to make a positive print. The
print is much easier for the untrained eye to read, and may be en-
larged to clarify fine detail lines of the original negative.
The negative itself may be greatly enlarged for ease in courtroom
viewing by the use of an overhead projector with suitable magnifica-
tion. The overhead projector enjoys such wide acceptance in class-
room use as a teaching aid that the court should not question its value
as an expository aid to the jury.
More attention is now being focussed by the trial bar on the
problem of demonstrating the particular injury suffered by the plaintiff.
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One visual aid that has been recently developed is the plastic model of
the actual fracture. The Medical Plastic Laboratory of Gatesville,
Texas, will undertake to dimension a fracture from a standard antero-
posterior and lateral X-ray view, and will build a model of the frac-
tured bone accurately portraying the characteristics of the particular
break. The operating surgeon may be willing to take a model of the
bone involved, cut it to duplicate the break, and then pin it or plate
it with the same nails, screws, and bone plates he used on the patient. It
goes without saying that this should be done in the workshop, not in
the courtroom. An Illinois court reversed because surgical instru-
ments were brought into the courtroom for a demonstration of the
operative technique, the court saying: "To permit an unlimited use
of such demonstrations of operative technique with surgical instru-
ments is not conducive to a fair and impartial consideration of the
proper issues presented."' The Missouri court, two years earlier, had
reversed plaintiff's verdict for the over-zealous conduct of his counsel
in compelling the defense medical expert to use a scalpel in a demon-
stration of the operative technique in a laminectomy.9
It is submitted the courts were right in those cases for the reason
that the demonstrations had insufficient probative value to outweigh
the dramatic appeal to emotion. Both cases involved surgery on a
completely anaesthetized patient, who had suffered no conscious or
remembered pain when the scalpel and other bright instruments were
used. The court might rule differently in a case similar to that of the
English actor who recently had his leg crushed in an elevator accident,
and suffered consciously through an amputation performed by a
resident with a pen-knife. If such a case were tried, then the pen-
knife itself might well be admissible, together with newsreel movies
of the procedure if any were taken. Where the hideous quality of the
exhibit is matched by the horror suffered by the plaintiff, then the
test of probative value is satisfied.
When suffering and humiliation is in issue, it would seem to be
proper to demonstrate the means and agencies which produce it. It
has been held in Missouri, Oklahoma, Texas and Oregon that a
plaintiff may be permitted to remove an artificial eye from its socket,
exhibit the empty socket, and replace the eye on the witness stand.10
Where this is part of the plaintiff's daily routine as the result of the
8 Winters v. Richerson, 9 Il. App. 2d 359, 132 N.E.2d 673, 674 (1956).
) Taylor v. Kansas City So. Ry., 364 Mo. 693, 266 S.W.2d 732 (1954).
10 Orscheln v. Scott, 90 Mo. App. 352, later app. 106 Mo. App. 583, 80 S.W. 982
(1901); Shell Petroleum Corp. v. Perrin, 179 Okla. 142, 64 P.2d 309 (1936); Bowerman
v. Columbia Motor Coach Sys., 132 Ore. 106, 284 Pac. 579 (1930); Davis v. Christmas,
248 S.V. 126 (Tex. Civ. App. 1923); Panhandle & S.F. v. Jones, 105 S.W.2d 443 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1937).
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injury, there is no valid reason why the jury should not see the same
repulsive sight the plaintiff himself is forced to observe, to gain insight
into his suffering. On the same basis a plaintiff who is forced to
undergo repeated catheterization should be entitled to put into evi-
dence the urethral sound that is used. A juror who has never seen one
cannot appreciate its size, nor the pain of its insertion, on mere de-
scription.
Along the same line, traction devices, head halters, cervical
collars, back braces, artificial limbs and prosthetic hands may be
demonstrated to the jury, and duplicates may be offered into evidence.
These devices sound rather more comfortable and useful than they
feel, and the measure of fair compensation for their enforced use will
depend on the jury's full understanding of their discomfort and awk-
wardness.
The same considerations of relevancy and probative value apply
to photographs. The earliest Supreme Court decision in Ohio dis-
cussing photographs is Cincinnati H. & D. Ry. Co. v. DeOnzo." The
plaintiff was an acrobatic performer, whose legs were injured in an
accident. He introduced photographs of his pre-accident normal legs
for the purpose of comparison with his post-accident lumpy and
swollen left leg. The defense objected on the ground that the con-
dition of the legs was a matter easily described by oral testimony, so
that the picture could not aid the jury. The supreme court observed
that the introduction of photographs had, even at that time, been
familiar practice for years and generally acquiesced in. The court
said,
From many authorities, decisions and textbooks, and from
the practice of courts in this state and elsewhere, it may be stated
as a general rule that photographs are admissible in evidence when
they appear to have been accurately taken, and are proven to be
correct representations of a subject in controversy, which subject
cannot itself be produced, or of some subject incident to it, and
also of such a nature as to throw light upon the disputed point.12
The court further approved the admission of pictures, torn from
a magazine, showing the acrobatic plaintiff performing certain acro-
batic feats before his injury. The feats had been orally described,
and the pictures were received because they "tended to enable the
jury more clearly to understand and apply the oral evidence."
The court today would not hold to the apparent qualification that
the picture of the subject is admissible when "the subject cannot itself
be produced." This is a matter only of convenience, and if the subject
31 87 Ohio St. 109, 100 N.E. 320 (1912).
12 Id. at 115.
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itself would be admissible the accurate representation of it would
be equally admissible.
For example, it is considered good trial practice for plaintiff to
introduce a photograph of a distorted amputation stump even though
the stump is fully exhibited to the jury and the picture is taken at
substantially the same time. This not only preserves the jury view
for the jury room, but also gives the same view to the judges of the
appellate courts who possess the power of remittitur. When the
appellate court weighs the amount of recovery against the gravity of
the injury, the demonstration of injury for the permanent record has
substantial practical value.
Colored photography poses no different problems. Its use is
relatively recent, and colored photographs in the courtroom are the
exception rather than the rule. Generally the ordinary black and
white photograph is adequate, more convenient, less expensive, and
offers far greater latitude in exposure and developing. Color is used
when there is a special desire or need for color, as when proving
bruises or discoloration.
When relevant and when properly verified, it would seem that
there should be no question as to their [color photographs] ad-
missibility, for by showing the actual colors of a subject they are
even a more faithful type of reproduction than black and white
photographs. Color as color often has evidential value.)3
Plaintiff often has access to exceptionally accurate and vivid
colored slides when the case involves destructive injury which requires
plastic surgery. It is common practice for plastic surgeons to have
the medical photographer at the hospital make serial colored slides
of the initial injury, the progressive operations, and the final result.
Such slides are often gruesome to view, particularly in burn
injuries, but this fact does not impair admissibility if they are accurate
representations and have probative value on the extent of the injury
and its concomitant suffering. The Minnesota court recognized that
it was possible the revolting aspects of colored photographs might
transgress the bounds of acceptability but nevertheless approved the
admission of photographs, in color, of the burned areas on a child's
body taken three months after the injury.'4 A later case approved
the use of colored photographs to show and demonstrate the condition
of terribly burned areas on a six-year old child immediately following
the injury.15
In the criminal branch of the law, it has long been standard
practice for the prosecution to introduce photographs of the battered
13 Scott, Photographic Evidence § 627 (1942).
14 Knox v. Granite Falls, 245 Minn. 11, 72 NAV.2d 67 (1955).
15 Johnson v. Clement F. Scully Constr. Co., 95 NAv.2d 409 (Minn. 1959).
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body of the victim of an assault, rape, or murder. Their admissibility
is often objected to because of the inflammatory effect of the hideous
portrayal, but the objections are universally overruled where the
photographs are identified as accurate representations and illustrative
of verbal testimony as to the wounds or mutilation. 16 Perhaps the
ultimate in this kind of camera work was used in Ohio's Sheppard
murder trial, where many detailed slides of the multiple wounds of the
victim were projected, in full color, expanded in size to four feet
square. Such use was approved in State v. Sheppard.7 It would seem
that the same considerations which would make such slides admissible
when life is at stake in a first degree murder trial would require ad-
mission of similar demonstrative evidence when mere property is at
stake in a civil trial.
In the usual situation the still picture of injuries, whether black
and white or colored, is a plaintiff's tool. The defense is not usually
concerned in emphasizing injury, or preserving an accurate record
of it. On the other hand the motion picture is primarily a defense
weapon. It is difficult for a plaintiff to prove what he cannot do, by
reason of limitation imposed by permanent injury. A motion picture
of the plaintiff not bowling or not painting his house would be absurd.
On the other hand, a picture of the plaintiff painting his house on a
tall ladder will have great probative force if the plaintiff swears he
can no longer climb a ladder.
Motion pictures, like other demonstrative evidence, must be
relevant to be admissible, and relevancy depends upon the issues in
the case and the action portrayed in the film. Again, the decision on
admissibility rests primarily in the discretion of the trial court. It
would seem that proper authentication of the motion picture should
require preliminary evidence as to the type of camera and particularly
the speed control at which the films were taken; the manner or cir-
cumstances of development of the film; the method of projection and
particularly the speed of projection; and most importantly, testimony
by a person, present at the taking, that the film as exhibited accurate-
ly and fairly represents the action and things which he saw in the
same proportion and at the same speed of action which he observed.
It is not essential that the person who took the film himself testify,
provided the qualifying information can be given by a person who was
present.'8
10 Annot., 159 A.L.R. 1413 (1945).
17 100 Ohio App. 345, 128 N.E.2d 471 (1955), aff'd 165 Ohio St. 293, 135 N.E.2d
340 (1956), cert. den. 352 U.S. 910 (1956).
18 Kortz v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 144 F.2d 676 (1944).
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In DeTunno v. Skull,18 a motion picture of the plaintiff changing
a tire became admissible when the plaintiff denied his ability to per-
form the feat in the manner portrayed on the film. It must seem sur-
prising to the casual reader of the cases to see how many involve
plaintiff's changing tires. One would suspect that plaintiffs' auto-
mobiles had a special affinity for flats. The mystery may be solved
by the following quotation from the Defense Law Journal:
Overzealous investigators have sometimes sought by devious
methods to entrap the plaintiff. The most common device is to
deflate the tire of plaintiff's automobile. When the plaintiff comes
out of his home and starts to change the tire, the movies are taken.
Again this may be the only method of securing good movies of the
subject and such tactics are justified if this is the only way to
secure them.20
One may question the assertion that the criminal act of malicious
mischief is a justifiable tactic, but it is clear that deliberate entrap-
ment is no bar to admissibility. In Maryland Cas. Co. v. Coker2 ' the
evidence established that plaintiff had been enticed to go along on a
fishing trip, complete with female companions and liquid refresh-
ments, by a secret agent of defendant who then procured motion pic-
tures of the plaintiff rowing a boat. The pictures were admitted,
although the court indicated its disgust at the method of procurement.
The writer had an unusual flat tire case, in which the plaintiff
had an operated ruptured disc and really couldn't change the tire.
When he found the tire valve removed one morning, he called his
brother-in-law to change it, and merely watched the process. While
the work was proceeding he observed a strange car parked down the
street, which pulled away rapidly when he stared at it. The event was
sufficiently strange for him to note the license number.
Deposition was later taken of the owner of that car, who admitted
that he was a private investigator hired by the railroad company de-
fendant, and that he and other operatives had taken movies of the
plaintiff from time to time, which had been delivered to the railroad.
At trial time we issued subpoena for the films, and proposed to show
them as demonstrative evidence that the plaintiff could not change a
tire. Unfortunately no trial court ruling on the point could be made,
because the defendant thereupon offered settlement in a sum too
generous to be refused. It would seem on principle that such films
would be admissible as an unposed, natural response of the plaintiff
to a demanding situation which demonstrated his physical inability
to cope with the problem himself. The defendant could hardly com-
19 75 Ohio L. Abs. 602, 144 N.E.2d 669 (1956).
20 4 Defense L.J. 143 (1953).
21 118 F.2d 43 (1941).
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plain that the necessary identification of the films through its opera-
tives would disclose its own skulduggery.
There can be no doubt that motion pictures pose sensitive prob-
lems. Jurors resent the invasion of privacy, and tend to resent en-
trapment. Thoughtful defense attorneys prefer pictures taken away
from the plaintiff's home, when he is voluntarily engaged in an ac-
tivity of his own choosing, and when the activity makes the plaintiff's
claim of injury completely and unqualifiedly false. If the pictures
show the plaintiff is a fraud, trying to hoodwink the jury, the pictures
will indelibly impress the fraud in the jury's mind. Movies which
tend to show only slight exaggeration of the claim of injury are value-
less and might well increase the size of the verdict. The pictures
must be so overwhelming that the natural resentment of the jury to
spying will be lost in their anger at the plaintiff for attempting to
defraud the defendant and deceive the court. Motion pictures of this
quality remain a rarity in the daily run of trials, simply because the
fraudulent plaintiff is rare.
Although the motion picture is chiefly a defense weapon, there
are occasions when the plaintiff will be able to proffer movies. The
wider sale of eight millimeter home movie cameras should produce
situations where the plaintiff will appear in pre-accident amateur
motion pictures that will clearly demonstrate his normal posture, gait,
and characteristics. The writer had one such case involving a child,
and in this case home movies of the child, post-accident, were also
introduced. They had been taken over a period of months as the child
made a slow, tortured, and incomplete recovery from a crippling
brain injury. The trial judge required a preliminary showing in
chambers to satisfy himself that the films were not posed or artificially
staged, and were more representational than inflammatory. Such pre-
liminary viewing is sound procedure, well designed to eliminate error.
Another area of real evidence is the demonstration, before the
jury, of the limitation of function produced by the injury. This is
akin to the demonstration of the scar, amputation stump, or deform-
ity, but goes beyond it in testing the power or movement of the
injured part. No Ohio case discusses this problem separately, al-
though the practice is commonplace in our courts and is recognized
by acquiescence. The many cases in other jurisdictions2 2 indicate
that the propriety of such demonstration is usually left to the discre-
tion of the court, and the demonstration is usually permitted. An
early Federal case, Osborne v. Detroit,13 approved a courtroom test
wherein the doctor stuck a pin into the right side of plaintiff's face,
her right arm and right leg, to demonstrate that her sensory nerves
22 Annot., 66 A.L.R. 2d 1382-1400 (1959).
23 32 Fed. 36 (1886).
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were so paralyzed that she would not feel pain and wince. A similar
test was disapproved in Madison Coal Corp. v. Altmire,24 where the
attorney performed the experiment with a needle. The conclusion to
be drawn is that pin-sticking had best be done by a licensed medical
practitioner who is sworn, who can testify to the scientific validity of
the test, and is subject to cross-examination.
There is almost universal disapproval of any test which is deliber-
ately designed to compel the plaintiff to cry out with pain in the jury's
presence. A doctor may be permitted to raise the plaintiff's arm to a
certain level, and testify that any further movement would cause pain,
but if he then manipulates the arm further and forcibly raises it so
the plaintiff cries out with pain as predicted, mistrial should be
granted for the abuse of the demonstrative technique. 5
On the other hand, where the demonstration causes plaintiff to
wince involuntarily, or grimace, no error occurs in the view of other
courts.2 6
The distinguishing feature in the cases seems to be the audible
cry or scream of pain, which the courts condemn as overly dramatic
and passion provoking. If plaintiff's counsel feels that the medical
dispute in the case is sufficiently critical to require a demonstration
of the tests given to the plaintiff by the examining physician, it might
be proper to film such tests in silent movies. Camera shots of a joint
locking, or a muscle group going into spasm, might be strong evidence
of injury, and admissible in a silent motion picture which would elimi-
nate the objectionable groans, grimaces, or cries of anguish.
On the current scene, the real controversy concerns, not demon-
strative evidence, but demonstrative argument. The plaintiff's bar,
under the leadership of NACCA, has embraced with fervor the chalk
talk style of final argument in which per diem calculations for pain
and suffering are made on the blackboard. There is no magic in the
technique (juries seldom return verdicts in an amount even approach-
ing the blackboard figures) but the defense bar is greatly alarmed by
the plausibility of the per diem argument. The defense efforts to
stamp out this technique have been vigorous, and to some extent
successful.
Pennsylvania has long forbidden attorneys in argument to tell
the jury the amount sued for, to state the amount of their real demand
or expectation, or to argue damages on a mathematical dollar formula.
24 215 Ky. 283, 284 S.V. 1068 (1926).
25 Landro v. Great N.R.R., 117 Minn. 306, 135 N.W. 991 (1912) ; Meyer v. Johnson,
244 Mo. App. 565, 30 S.W.2d 641 (1930); Peters v. Hockley, 152 Ore. 434, 54 P.2d 1059
(1935).
26 Willoughby v. Zylstra, 5 Cal. App. 2d 297, 42 P.2d 685 (1935); Shell Petroleum
Corp. v. Perrin, 179 Okla. 142, 64 P.2d 309 (1936) ; Hiller v. Johnson, 162 Wis. 19, 154
NA. 845 (1916).
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The major decision on the point in recent years is Botta v. Brunner."
The analysis of the New Jersey Court was that argument must be
limited to matters in evidence; that no evidence can be adduced as to
the value of pain because it has no market value; that any argument
as to value is therefore sheer speculation unsupported by evidence and
cannot be permitted. It would make equal sense, or equal nonsense, to
say that juries can return verdicts based only on evidence, that no evi-
dence on the value of pain can be adduced, and that therefore no
verdict can be given to compensate for pain since it would necessarily
involve sheer speculation. One suspects the real reasoning behind the
court's opinion would run: per diem arguments lead to overly large
verdicts; excessive verdicts may be destructive of the insurance in-
dustry; the insurance industry is essential to our economy; therefore
public policy condemns the type of argument that seems too effective.
The opinion quotes Belli's Modern Trials as to the effectiveness of
the per diem argument, which indicates the court itself was looking
outside the record in the case and was engaged in policy-making.
The effect of the Botta v. Brunner decision is to permit evidence
as to the existence of pain, but deny argument as to its value. The
skill of the advocate is not to be used in the critical area of the
amount of recovery. The Texas court, in an inspired phrase, referred
to this as the "By guess and by golly" rule of procedure, and has
rejected the Botta rule in Continental Bus Sys., Inc. v. Toombs.2
In the Federal courts of the Sixth Circuit the per diem approach
to computing damages is sanctioned by Imperial Oil Ltd. v. Drlik.2
At the appellate level in Ohio, in Miller v. Loy, it has been held that
blackboard calculations, not based on specific evidence, may be per-
mitted in the discretion of the court."
The prerogative of trial counsel in final argument is stated in the
early case of Southard v. Morris : '
His illustrations may be as various as the resources of his
genius, and his argument as full and profound as his learning can
make it.
As early as 1853 it was held, in Legg v. Drake,3 that counsel in
final argument could read from books and other works of the sciences
or the arts, or repeat passages from memory, by way of argument or
illustration "adopting it and making it a part of his own address to
the jury; but not using it as evidence in the case."
27 26 N.J. 82, 138 A.2d 713 (1958).
28 325 S.W.2d 153 (Tex. Civ. App. 1959).
29 234 F.2d 4 (1956).
30 101 Ohio App. 405, 140 N.E.2d 38 (1956). For further discussion, see Note, 19
Ohio St. L.J. 780 (1958).
31 14 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 465, 31 Ohio N.P. 684 (1913).
32 1 Ohio St. 286 (1853).
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Appropriate quotations from the Bible and from Shakespeare
are part of the stock in trade of many a trial lawyer, and it has never
been deemed necessary to put the Book in evidence to support the
quotation used. One wonders whether the Bott 3s rule, logically ex-
tended, would permit the attorney to argue negligence. Negligence
is defined as the failure to exercise the care of the ordinarily prudent
person; but no evidence as to what an ordinarily prudent person
actually does on a statistical basis has ever been permitted. Whenever
an attorney argues what the ordinarily careful man would do, he in-
dulges in speculation, but this kind of speculation which seeks to
persuade the jury to adopt a particular point of view is the essence
of the advocate's art.
It should be recognized that there may be considerable validity
to the defense viewpoint that argument on per diem valuation for
pain and suffering should not be permitted in many cases where it is
now used. The argument is permissible only when there is a basis in
the evidence for the argument. The evidentiary basis required is not
evidence of value, but evidence of per diem pain. Pain is transient and
varied. It comes and goes, sometimes hard and hot, sometimes dull,
sometimes so slight it is scarcely noticed. The attack of the defense
on the per diem valuation argument should be directed against the
concept of per diem pain. When daily pain is proven, then daily com-
pensation is justified. The hospital records of the days immediately
following injury or operation will ordinarily give adequate basis for
arguing the existence of pain each day, and the necessity of compen-
sating for it each day.
In the late stages of injury, when pain is occasional, plaintiff's
counsel will be on safer grounds to argue a per annum basis of re-
covery, provided his evidence has developed the fact that pain and
suffering will occur during some part of every year.
The blackboard is not a substitute for evidence, but a useful
demonstrative tool for illustrating the argument of counsel as to the
advocated values to be placed upon those items of damages established
by the proof. Blow-ups of hospital charts, demonstration by model
and by exhibition, charting of significant testimony, and quotation
from the classics are all a part of effective, demonstrative final argu-
ment. The blackboard and chalk constitute a similar tool, equally
effective, and equally legitimate. It is to be hoped that the use of the
blackboard-the primary teaching tool-will continue to be approved
by Ohio courts. The art of advocacy is essential to the adversary
system, and it is submitted that advocates should be encouraged to
advocate, and to advocate effectively.
33 Supra note 27.
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